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I. INTRODUCTION

Immigration reform has become the new third rail in politics. In
the three decades since President Reagan's executive immigration
orders and the accompanying Immigration Reform and Control Act

* Professor of Legal Writing, University of San Diego School of Law; former
Tanzania Country Director, Asylum Access. I would like to thank Michael Kagan for
his helpful comments on a previous draft, and Jordan Barry and Dov Fox for their
supportive insights throughout this process. I am especially grateful to Marshall
Jensen at the Tennessee Law Review for his sound editing decisions and flexibility as
an ever-changing legal landscape has necessitated multiple last-minute revisions.
Finally, this Article would not have been possible with the unwavering support and
patience of No61 Harlow, to whom I am deeply indebted.
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of 1986,1 not a single major immigration measure has passed in
Congress. 2 Nor is one likely to pass anytime soon. Inaction on such
a politically divisive issue appears, for now, to be the more prudent
electoral expedient.
The irony of this inaction is that Congress could, legally, pass
any type of immigration measure it wants without fear of
meaningful court intervention. Due to the "constitutional oddity"
known as the plenary power doctrine, the political branches of
government are given near carte blanche to enact any immigration
control measure they see fit without judicial review of its
constitutionality.3 In the absence of Congressional action, however,
much of the significant movement on immigration has come from the
executive branch in the form of executive orders, signed pursuant to
broad immigration control powers delegated to the President by
Congress in 1965.4 That power has been wielded most recently in
the form of President Trump's two controversial executive orders on
immigration-the so-called "Muslim bans"-that have sucked up so
much of the oxygen in this nation's political discourse during the
President's first months in office. 5
But there is something uniquely different about these executive
orders: unlike all other immigration policies enacted since the
plenary power doctrine was established in 1889, these orders appear
likely to be struck down as unconstitutional. 6 While the Trump

1. Immigration Reform and Control Act ("Simpson-Mazzoli Act"), Pub. L. 99603, 100 Stat. 3445 (1986) (providing legal status to certain classes of undocumented
immigrants who entered the country before 1982).
2. Roger Chapman and James Clement, CULTURE WARS: ISSUES, VOICES, AND
VIEWPOINTS 77 (2009) ("Until 2012, there was virtually no movement in Congress to
deal with the problem of the 11 million illegal immigrants living in the United States
since the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which granted
amnesty to many of the 3.2 million illegal immigrants living in the United States.").
3. Stephen H. Legomaky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
CongressionalPower, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 282 (1984).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ("Hart-Celler Act"), H.R. 2580, Pub.
L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1968); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (delegating to the executive
branch the power to control migration from specific countries).
5. Exec. Order No. 13769, titled "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist
Entry Into the United States" (Jan. 27, 2017);
Exec. Order No. 13780, titled
"Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (Mar. 6,
2017) (hereinafter the "executives orders" or the "orders").
6. See Washington v. Trump et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, Dkt. No. 52
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (finding that the states "are likely to succeed on the merits
of the claims that would entitle them to relief," including constitutional claims based
on the Equal Protection Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the
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Department of Justice has quite reasonably relied on over a century
of precedent to argue that immigration actions of the executive are
simply "unreviewable," 7 courts preliminarily rejected that contention
in what has become "sprawling" litigation over the Orders. 8 It
appears that some immigration actions-at least those with an
explicitly anti-Muslim origin story, a thinly-veiled religious
preference, and an even thinner national security justification-may
in fact be so noxious and violative of "contemporary constitutional
norms" as to fall outside the limits of the previously-limitless
plenary power.9 At a minimum, these orders have tested and will
continue to test the outer limits of plenary power in the national
security context.
This Article endeavors to define those limits, and offers a new
judicial review paradigm for constitutional challenges to
immigration actions implicating national security interests. The
Article proceeds in three parts. First, the Article examines the three
doctrinal pillars upon which plenary power rests: 1) the extraconstitutional, inherent sovereign right of nations to control

Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Int'l. Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, et al., 857 F.3d 554, 622 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that
"Section 2(c) of EO-2 is likely unconstitutional"); cf. Trump v. Int'l. Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 582 U.S. - (2017) (granting certiorari and staying the
injunction entered by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals).
7. Washington v. Trump, 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, Dkt. No. 50 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2,
2017) at 20-22 (asserting that immigration decisions are "areas within the exclusive
domain of the political branches of government.... It is thus well-established that
courts cannot evaluate the President's national security and foreign affairs
judgments, especially in the immigration context.... It is simply not possible for the
Court here to evaluate the President's executive order without passing judgment on
the President's national security and foreign affairs determinations... There is ...
no basis for the Judiciary to second-guess the President's determinations in that
regard.").
8. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
Immigration
Exceptionalism, 111 N.W. L. REV. 583, 585 n.6 (2017) (listing the growing number of
litigations and declaring that "[tlhe litigation over President Trump's executive order
is sprawling"); Int'l. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 89 ("The
Government has repeatedly asked this Court to ignore evidence, circumscribe our
own review, and blindly defer to executive action . . we would do a disservice to our
constitutional structure were we to . . . silence the call for meaningful judicial
review.").
9. See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?A Tentative Apology
and PredictionFor Our Strange But Unexceptional ConstitutionalImmigration Law,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 259 (2000) ("[I]f a case arises which challenges
discrimination on a ground that violates contemporary constitutional norms, the
Court will be faced with a new situation.").
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migration as they see fit; 2) judicial deference to the political
branches to "speak with one voice" on behalf of the nation in the
exercise of this sovereign right, even when such exercise violates
constitutional rights; and 3) recognition of the linkage between
foreign affairs and national security on the one hand, and
immigration controls on the other.
These three fundamental
characteristics of plenary power have led the Court to "uphold[| with
depressing regularity statutes discriminating on the basis of race,
sexual orientation, political activity, and sex and birth out-ofwedlock."' 0
Second, the Article highlights recent implied and express attacks
on each of these plenary power pillars, suggesting that the doctrine
Courts no longer
is "less robust in the twenty-first century.""
invoke "inherent national sovereignty" as a justification to uphold an
immigration decision, nor do they cite the notorious but still
controlling Chinese Exclusion Case articulating this justification and
establishing the plenary power doctrine.1 2 Moreover, while no
federal immigration decision has yet been struck down on the merits
as unconstitutional1 3, courts in the twenty-first century have become
increasingly comfortable with reviewing the constitutionality of
immigration actions, itself a departure from the traditional plenary
power doctrine.1 4 Perhaps most surprisingly, courts have intimated

10. Id. at 257 ("These decisions, and the statutes they upheld, are inconsistent
with fundamental values reflected in domestic constitutional law, yet they continue
to constitute the foundation of immigration law.").
11. Michael Kagan, Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law? (The
Presidentis Trying to Find Out), 1 NEV. L.J. FORUM 80, 85 (2017) (hereinafter "Is the
Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?").
12. Id. at 91.
13. As this Article goes to print, the various court decisions concerning the
Trump executive orders have only considered whether the plaintiffs have made a
sufficient showing of irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits for a
preliminary injunction to issue. No case has yet issued a final decision on the merits,
though the Supreme Court will hear merits arguments in October 2017. Trump v.
Int'l. Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S.
("The clerk is directed to set a briefing
schedule that will permit the cases to be heard during the first session of October
Term 2017."). By that point, challenges to an executive order designed to remain in
effect for only 120 days may very well be moot. See Garrett Epps, Trump's Limited
Travel Ban Wctory, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/06/the-trump-administrations-limited-victory/531708/
("The
Supreme Court granted review of the president's travel ban in October, but the Court
clearly hopes - and strongly hints - that the case will be moot by then.").
14. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (finding that the
indefinite detention of a deportable alien would violate constitutional due process)
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that they will not simply step aside on the assumption that a
particular immigration action affects national security. As we have
seen in litigation over Trump's executive orders, courts may be
willing to engage in a more searching judicial inquiry of the national
security interests served by an otherwise nakedly discriminatory
immigration decision, at least in limited circumstances.
Third, the Article attempts to reconcile plenary power's past with
its present and to articulate a new judicial review paradigm for
immigration decisions implicating both national security interests
and important constitutional rights. In doing so, the Article does not
endorse a wholesale rejection of plenary power as a relic of a distant
and racist past, as so many progressive immigration scholars have
urged for decades.' 5 Nor does it defend the doctrine against recent
rational, if inconsistent, judicial critiques. Instead, it acknowledges
the wisdom of some level of judicial deference when immigration
decisions truly affect national security interests, but advocates for a
more searching judicial inquiry of whether national security
interests are central to the immigration decision, as well as a limited
"normalizing" of constitutional immigration review where national
security concerns are not implicated.
The Article concludes with four recommendations that, standing
alone, have been suggested in various places, but together form a
new judicial paradigm for constitutional review. First, courts should
legitimize the immense power of the federal government to control
immigration by directly and affirmatively articulating the source of
that power as enumerated in the Constitution. This textual source
will differ depending on the individual case, as the vast realm of
"immigration law" writ large often affects domestic interstate

(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983) (Congress must choose "a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing" its immigration power)); cf.
Peter J. Spiro, How the Courts Could See Their Way to Striking Down the Trump
Travel Ban, LAWFARE (Feb. 2, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/howcourts-could-see-their-way-striking-down-trump-travel-ban ("The courts have never
imposed meaningful constraints on the executive branch in th[e immigration]
context.")
15. See David A. Martin, Why Immigration'sPlenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 29, 30 (2015) (hereinafter "Why Plenary Power Endures") (observing
that "the doctrine ha[s] been widely and persistently condemned in the scholarly
literature. It almost seems an obligatory rite of passage for scholars embarking on
the study of immigration law to provide their own critique of plenary power or
related doctrines of deference.").
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commerce, naturalization, foreign affairs, and other enumerated
powers.16

Second, courts should thoroughly examine whether immigration
actions do-or do not-implicate national security interests and
were taken primarily for national security reasons. This searching
judicial inquiry calls for more than accepting at face value a
governmental statement that a national security interest exists.
Instead, courts should independently examine the four corners of the
immigration action and the facts and circumstances giving rise to
the action to determine both: 1) whether a genuine and bona fide
national security interests actually exists to justify the action, and 2)
whether this national security interest primarily motivated the
action. 17
Third, where courts find legitimate national security interests
and motivations at stake, they should adhere to a modified form of
plenary power deference consistent with the Court's holdings in
Kleindienst v. Mandel and Kerry v. Din.1 8 By implementing a
threshold level of review with bite to determine whether an
immigration case truly implicates national security, courts can then
justifiably accord deference in areas where the political branches
truly ought to "speak with one voice" on behalf of the nation-such
as foreign affairs and national security-and apply more exacting
scrutiny to purely domestic or ministerial actions justifying no such
deference.
Fourth, courts should continue the process of normalizing or
"constitutionalizing" immigration law affecting purely non-national
security interests, and apply similar judicial review doctrines to
these cases as it does a domestic due process or equal protection
case. This approach, while a direct repudiation of plenary power in
most immigration contexts, finds far greater moral and structural
justification than the expansive plenary power doctrine of the
twentieth century.
Plenary power does in fact "endure,"1 9 though "it remains quite
difficult to define exactly where it stands. Donald Trump assumed
16. Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114
MICH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (hereinafter "PlenaryPower is Dead?').
17. As discussed below, the Article anticipates and addresses critics of this
approach, who will alternately claim that all immigration decisions implicate
national security concerns and that no court is equipped to divine the true
motivations of legislators and executives.
18. See generally Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Kerry v. Din, 135
S.Ct. 2128 (2015).
19. See generally Martin, supra note 15, at 1.
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the presidency in the midst of this constitutional ambiguity[,]" 2 0 and
wasted no time forcing courts to clarify the scope of the doctrine.
Even if his executive orders ultimately withstand constitutional
scrutiny, that would not necessarily signal a reinvigoration of
plenary power. Conversely, neither would a rejection of his actions
by the Court spell the death knell for deference to the political
branches on immigration. As with so much of the Trump presidency,
we must take his orders on immigration for what they are-extreme,
unprecedented actions, at least for the twenty-first century. But to
make sense of the long-term jurisprudential fallout from these
unprecedented times, we must examine the entire shifting landscape
of immigration law and its effect on the next, likely less
extraordinary case. This Article attempts to pinpoint that shifting
landscape and provide a way forward for the next case.
II. THE THREE PILLARS OF PLENARY POWER
The plenary power doctrine, as currently constructed, rests on
three doctrinal pillars: inherent national sovereignty, judicial
deference, and national security linkage.
The doctrine endures
despite a century of withering criticism because of continued fealty
to these three foundational characteristics. The common narrative
justifying plenary power along these pillars proceeds as follows:
1) The right to regulate the flow of non-citizens entering the
country, including the right to determine who may enter,
who must leave, and under what circumstances they may
enter or leave, is an inherent power of any sovereign
nation. 2 1 As an "inherent" power, it does not derive from
any enumerated constitutional power, but exists as an
"extra-constitutional" natural right of all sovereign
nations. 22
2) As an extra-constitutional power, the right to control
immigration is not subject to traditional constitutional
limitations. These limitations include both individual

20. Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?, supra note 11, at 82.
21. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889) ("The power of
the . . . government to exclude aliens from the United States is an incident
of sovereignty which cannot be surrendered . . .").
22. Immigration Exceptionalism, supra note 8, at 582-83 (discussing the need to
"tame immigration's extra-constitutional stats and thus allow for normal judicial
review when constitutional rights are implicated").
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rights that might otherwise be asserted by individuals
challenging state action, as well as separation of powers
limitations such as judicial review. 23
Thus, in the
tripartite system of the federal government, this inherent
sovereign power should be exercised by the political
branches, and the judiciary should exercise deference to
the executive and legislative branches in exercising this
power. 24
3) Nowhere is this deference accorded more weight than in
the area of foreign affairs generally, and national security
specifically. Immigration policies are inexorably linked
with foreign affairs, and courts should tread lightly in
reviewing the foreign policy rationales of the political
branches. 25
When immigration implicates national
security interests, courts should accord even greater
deference, as it does in other non-immigration national
security contexts. 26
This section sketches the contours of these three pillars upon
which plenary power rests, and highlights various doctrinal and
textual critiques of each. The following section discusses how each of
plenary power's three pillars are under attack, with reference to
recent Supreme Court precedent and events surrounding President
Trump's executive orders.

23. Id.
24. Spiro, supra note 14. (With such a consistent history of deference, it is easy
for one to assume that "[t]he court has given the political branches the judicial
equivalent ofa blank check to regulate immigration as they see fit.").
25. See Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 40-41. (urging critics of
plenary power to reconsider the inexorable "linkage" between immigration policy and
foreign affairs); cf. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of DemiSovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L. L. 121, 165-67 (1994) (arguing that immigration law
has long been tied to the fagade of a foreign policy rationale to justify federal
preemption).
26. See Joel Rubin, Courts rarely second-guess the president on nationalsecurity.
But that doesn't mean they can't, experts said, L.A. Tnams, (Feb. 7, 2017, 3:37 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-live-updates-9th-circuit-arguments-courts-havebeen-reluctant-to-1486509412-htmlstory.html
("The tendency by judges not to
question the president on national security issues is rooted in the belief that the
president, aided by national security advisors and the wealth of information at their
disposal, is in the best position to make such decisions, said Matt Waxman, a
national security law expert at Columbia University.").
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A. Plenary Power Foundations:Inherent National Sovereignty
"The original challenge of immigration law is that it is not
explicitly one of the enumerated constitutional powers of the federal
government." 27 Under our federalist constitutional system, the
federal government possesses only those powers expressly
enumerated in the Constitution, while the states retain the residual
police powers. 28 However, the Constitution is silent on authority to
enact immigration controls. By what authority, then, does the
federal government assert what has become the immense power to
authorize or restrict migration into the country? 29 The Court
answered that question in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
commonly known by its derisively descriptive moniker: the Chinese
Exclusion Case. 30 While the facts, circumstances surrounding, and
ultimate holding of this case are so noxious to the twenty-first
century observer as to be commonly analogized to other "anticanon"31 cases like Plessy v. Ferguson, the Chinese Exclusion Case
remains among the most important precedents for defining the
foundations and scope of immigration plenary power. Perhaps more
importantly, it has never been overturned. 32

27. Plenary Power is Dead!, supra note 16, at 2.
28. Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 34; see also Arizona v. United

States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) ("In preemption analysis, courts should assume
that 'the historic police powers of the States' are not superseded . . ."); Clare
Huntington, The ConstitutionalDimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L.
REv. 787, 838 (2008).
29. Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 34 ("The closest enumerated
power would seem to be Congress's authority to adopt 'an uniform Rule of
Naturalization.' But naturalization is not the same thing as admission to the
territory, and the Naturalization Clause has never seemed fully up to the task of
supporting the complicated superstructure of federal immigration controls erected"
in the century-plus of constitutional immigration jurisprudence.); Stella Burch Elias,
The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 734 (2013) (discussing range
of subfederal immigration-related measures in response to lack of enumerated
federal authority and federal policymaking inaction); Immigration Exceptionalism,
supra note 8 at 600-609 (contending that immigration must be viewed as
"exceptional" from a federalism standpoint to justify federal preemption over
immigration law).
30. 130 U.S. at 604.
31. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (arguing
that infamous Supreme Court cases like Plessy v. Ferguson and Korematsu v. United
States do not "involve bad reasoning, nor are they morally repugnant . . I argue that
anticanonical cases achieve their status through historical happenstance . . .").
32. Peter J. Spiro Trump's Anti-Muslim Plan is Awful. And Constitutional, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1NKbY67n ("Unlike other bygone constitutional
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Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese immigrant who lawfully settled
in California in 1875, during a period of rampant anti-Chinese
xenophobia. 33 In 1882, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act,
prohibiting new Chinese immigrants from arriving, but not expelling
Mr. Chae and others like him who were already in the U.S.34 The
law also provided a procedure by which lawful Chinese immigrants
already present in the United States could leave the country
temporarily and return without threat of exclusion. 35
Mr. Chae decided to visit China in 1887, but journeyed back only
after "carefully obtaining the official certificate provided by law as
the means for his readmission." 36 On September 7, 1888, after his
visit to China, Mr. Chae left Hong Kong on a steamship carrying his
return certificate.3 7 Three weeks after Mr. Chae left China and was
quite literally in uncharted waters in the middle of the Pacific
Ocean, Congress passed the following law: "[l]t shall be unlawful for
any Chinese laborer . . . who shall have departed . . . and who shall
have not returned before the passage of this act, to return to or
remain in the United States." 3 8 Completely unaware of the passage
of this act, and with no option but to return to the U.S., Mr. Chae
arrived by boat to San Francisco, his home of fifteen years.3 9 He was
promptly detained and ordered excluded from the country pursuant
to Congress's act. 40
Mr. Chae challenged the law on equal protection grounds, and
appealed the case all the way to the Supreme Court. Sidestepping
the equal protection issue, the Court focused instead on a more
basic, novel question: Could Congress enact an immigration
exclusion law? 4 1 Given the lack of any enumerated constitutional

curiosities that offend our contemporary sensibilities, the Chinese Exclusion case has
never been overturned.").
33. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
34. Id. at 597.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 582; Why PlenaryPower Endures, supra note 15, at 31.
37. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
38. Id. at 599.
39. Id.
40. Id. This 1888 law stemmed from xenophobic and racist agitation in
California scapegoating the Chinese in the midst of a severe economic recession, and
represented the low point in decades of anti-Chinese rhetoric by, among others, the
namesake of the former Boalt Hall. See Charles Reichmann, Anti-Chinese Racism at
Berkeley: The Case for Renaming Boalt Hall (May 8, 2017), available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965219.
41. Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?, supra note 11, at 83.
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power to enact such a regulation, the Court rested on the inherent
powers of a nation, which to the Court included the power of
immigration control:
That the government of the United States, through the action
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its
territory is a proposition which we do not think open to
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its
independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to
that extent subject to the control of another power. 42
The Court further explained why this sovereign authority cannot
be a power exercised by the states despite not being explicitly
conferred upon the federal government in the Constitution:

[T]he United States, in their relation to foreign countries and
their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with
powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute
independence and security throughout its entire territory. ...
"mhe government which is alone capable of controlling and
managing their interests in all these respects is the
government of the Union. . . . It can, then, in effecting these
objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments
within the American territory. . . ."43
In this sense, the Court "invoke [d] sovereignty . . . primarily to
justify exclusive federal power to control immigration, despite the

42. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04; Why PlenaryPower Endures, supra
note 15, at 35 ("By invoking the very concept of independent nationhood, Field is
staking out an additional theoretical foundation for specific federal powers - one not
confined to enumerated text. The Constitution emphatically was written to establish
a nation, not a mere association of persons seeking to achieve a limited range of
contractual purposes. Asserting jurisdiction over a territory, which includes
authority to choose which noncitizens to admit or exclude, is simply part of what it
means to be a sovereign nation.").
43. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 608 ("It is invested with power over all the
foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with
other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state governments. It has jurisdiction
over all those general subjects of legislation and sovereignty which affect the
interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require uniformity of
regulations and laws.. . .").
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lack of an anchor in explicit constitutional text."44 This extraconstitutional justification has long drawn the ire of originalists and
textualists. 45 Nevertheless, this aspect of the Court's holding-that
Congress has the power to enact restrictions on immigrationremains good law today. 46 However, the Court gave little more than
passing acknowledgement to what should have been an
uncontroversial maxim of constitutional law: that sovereign powers,
even inherent sovereign powers, are still restricted by the
Constitution. 47 It never discussed, much less ruled on, the substance
of Mr. Chae's claim that a blanket ban on Chinese immigration
based on widespread racial animus might offend the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution. 48 The Court just assumed
that because the power to control immigration was "inherent," that
it was also unlimited. This endorsement of unchecked federal
authority over immigration "established the basic parameters for
immigration law for over a century," and opened the door for the
political branches to enact openly discriminatory and unjust

44. Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 38; cf. Arizona v. United
States, 132 S.Ct. at 2511-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("As a sovereign, Arizona has the
inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations
expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress.").
45. See Ilya Somin, Why Trump's refugee order is unconstitutional,WASH. POST
(Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/02/05/why-trumps-refugee-order-is-unconstitutionaldiscrimination-on-the-basis-of-religionutm term=.1ef799e5e5d4 ("I would add that
the plenary power doctrine is ultimately indefensible and should be overruled by the
Supreme Court. Nothing in the text or the original meaning of the Constitution
indicates that immigration law is an exception to the constitutional rights that
constrain every other type of government policy. The text does limit a few specific
constitutional rights to American citizens, such as those protected by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But this only underscores the
fact that other constitutional rights extend to everyone. There would be no need to
explicitly limit some rights to citizens if there were a general presumption that noncitizens are excluded.").
46. Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?, supra note 11, at 83; Spiro,
supra note 14.
47. See, e.g., Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 93, 10205 (2014) (discussing inherent rights of sovereign nations to enter into treaties, but
observing that such treaty-making powers remain constrained by constitutional
separation of powers and federalism limitations).
48. Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?, supranote 11, at 84 ("Raising
such a claim for a Chinese man would have posed a doctrinal challenge, since at the
time the Court was of the opinion that the 'main purpose of [the Fourteenth
Amendment] was the freedom of the African race.' Moreover, the Court did not apply
the Equal Protection Clause to the federal government until the twentieth century.").
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B. Plenary Power Application: JudicialDeference
Having
chosen
an
extra-constitutional
foundation
for
immigration law, the Court quickly determined that no role existed
for the judiciary to review constitutional challenges to immigration
laws. The result of this sweeping doctrine was that immigration law
became "a constitutional oddity" largely immune from the civil
liberties revolution of the twentieth century.50
In Chae Chan Ping, for example, the Court refused even to
consider the merits of Mr. Chae's equal protection challenge, holding
in a unanimous opinion that immigration decisions by the
"legislative department" to exclude aliens are "conclusive upon the
judiciary." 51 The Court reasoned that the propriety of immigration
decisions and their impact on foreign affairs with other countries
"are not questions for judicial determination. If there be nay just
ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the
political department of our government, which is alone competent to
act on the subject." 52

Three years later, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court
rejected the claim that aliens possessed any constitutional due
process protections to appeal immigration decisions. 53 In affirming
the propriety of an immigration officer's summary denial of entry to
a Japanese immigrant seeking to reunite with her husband, the
Court found that Congress may lawfully make immigration officers
"the sole and exclusive judge . . . and no other tribunal, unless
expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or
controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted." 54

49. Id.; cf. Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 38 (rejecting the
narrative that "the Court's invocation of sovereignty in Chae Chan Ping [was] an
illegitimate judicial move meant to introduce a factor that will trump rights

claims.").
50. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 282.
51. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
52. Id. at 609.
53. 142 U.S. 651, 667 (1892).
54. Id. ("It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who
have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the
United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to such law, shall
be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the
legislative and executive branches of the national government. As to such persons,
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The following year, the Court extended the plenary power
doctrine from exclusion of aliens not physically present on sovereign
soil to deportation of aliens in the United States. In Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, the Court upheld the deportation of a Chinese
national purely on nationality grounds, finding that, "[t]he power of
Congress . . . to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any
specified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely
through executive officers. . ."55
56
In Yamataya v. Fisher,
the Court appeared momentarily
willing to entertain a limited form of constitutional due process
protections for immigrants, but an examination of the case confirms
that "the right to due process in immigration proceedings was little
more than an empty formalism."5 7 Yamataya, a Japanese woman,
had been excluded from the U.S. based on a federal immigration
inspector's finding that she was "likely to become a public charge."58
Yamataya appealed, claiming that she had not been afforded a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the inspector's decision.59 The
Court acknowledged that the petitioner lacked "knowledge of our
language; that she did not understand the nature and import of the
questions propounded to her; that the investigation made was a
'pretended' one; and that she did not, at the time, know that the
investigation had reference to her being deported from the
country."6 0
Justice Harlan even reasoned that administrative
officers "may [not] disregard the fundamental principles that inhere
in due process of law." 6 1 But the Court nevertheless concluded that
such personal "misfortune . . . constitutes no reason . . . under any
rule of law, for the intervention of the court."62

This "empty formalism" defined the Warren Court's immigration
decisions of the 1950s and 1960s, at a time when the Court's
domestic constitutional jurisprudence was marked by expansions of

the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly
conferred by Congress, are due process of law.") (emphasis added).
55. 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893).
56. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
57. Matthew J. Lindsay, Due Process and Plenary Power, IMMIGRATION PROF
BLOG
(Jun.
22,
2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration
/2015/06/symposium-on-kerry-v-din-due-process-and-plenary-power-by-matthew-jlndsay.html.
58. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 90.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 93.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 95.
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rights for individuals. For example, in 1950, a German-born wife of
a U.S. citizen challenged her summary exclusion from entry at Ellis
Island by an immigration officer on national security grounds.6 3 In
aflirming the executive branch's decision to exclude her without a
hearing and on the basis of secret evidence, the Court found that,
"The action of the executive officer under such authority is final and
conclusive. Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of
persons who have gained entry into the United States, it is not
within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law,
to review the determination of the political branch of the
Government to exclude a given alien." 64

In 1953, the Court extended this reasoning in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Messi, when it found that a non-citizen facing
exclusion was not entitled to any due process whatsoever, even if the
result was indefinite detention.6 5 After living in the United States
for more than 25 years, Ignatz Mezei attempted to return to his
native Romania to visit his dying mother but was denied entry into
the country.6 6 Upon his return to the U.S., he was denied entry and
held at Ellis Island for over four years on national security grounds
while the government attempted and failed to find another country
to host him.67

The Court rejected his habeas claim that his

indefinite detention violated due process: "Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned."6 8

63. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 540 (1950).
64. Id. at 543. Two years after the ruling, Knauff found relief from the political
branches when newspaper editorials decried her exclusion and the Attorney General

.

granted her a hearing. Knauff lost before the Immigration Board of Special Inquiry
but won a reversal at the Board of Immigration Appeals, after which she became a
lawful permanent resident.
See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 933, 945-58 (1995) (providing an illuminating account of Knauff s journey
before and after her Supreme Court case).
65. 345 U.S. 206, 209 (1953).
66. Id. at 210; see also Weisselberg, supra note 64, at 952-56.
67. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213; see also Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and
the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Constitution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV.
U.L. REV. 1017, 1024 (2007) ("Because Mezei could not establish his nationality,
other nations would not take him, and he remained confined by the government on
Ellis Island.").
68. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213. The Court reached this conclusion even though the
"process" afforded Mezei was no process at all. See Slocum, supra note 67, at 1024
("Mezei was excluded without a hearing based on confidential information. . .
Despite the indefinite, and potentially permanent, nature of his detention, the Court
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The Court reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine throughout the
1970's, when it upheld the exclusion of a self-described
"revolutionary Marxist,"6 9 upheld a statute requiring a five-year
period of admission as a prerequisite for aliens wishing to receive
medical care,70 and upheld a facially discriminatory provision of the
Immigration Act that recognized the relationship between children
born out of wedlock with their mothers but not their fathers.7 1 As
recently as 2015, the Court upheld the exclusion of a permanent
resident's spouse on unspecified "national security" grounds based
on secret evidence never made public. 72
In short, "the Supreme Court has never struck down an
immigration classification, even one based on race." 73 With such a
consistent history of deference, it is easy for one to assume that
"[t]he court has given the political branches the judicial equivalent of
a blank check to regulate immigration as they see fit."7 4
As
the Mandel Court put it, "over no conceivable subject is the

held that Mezei's due process rights were not violated because Mezei was treated 'as
if stopped at the border' and thus had no due process rights.").
69. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 772 (1972) ("The Court without
exception has sustained Congress' plenary power to make rules for the admission of
aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has
forbidden.").
70. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) ("For reasons long recognized as
valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States
and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal
Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with
foreign powers, . . . such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to
either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.").
71. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420, 430 (1998) (same); cf. Chin, supra note 17, at 272 (critiquing the view that these
cases turned on the plenary power doctrine, because "unmarried fathers are in a
class by themselves; differential treatment of this group is probably the sex
classification which the Court has been most willing to find reasonable
domestically").
72. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (recasting petitioner's claim as a
deprivation of "her constitutional right to live in the United States with her spouse,"
for which "[t]here is no constitutional right," instead of focusing on her procedural
constitutional right to due process of law); see also Plenary Power is Dead!, supra
note 16, at 8 ("Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Din converts constitutional due
process into a similar kind of empty shell. It assumes that Din held a "protected
liberty interest" in the government's consideration of her husband's visa application,
yet denies that that interest entitled either her or Berashk to information that would
enable them to comprehend, let alone challenge, its rejection of his application.").
73. Spiro, supra note 14.
74. Id.
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legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens."7 5 While "the courts have justified this
constitutional exceptionalism on the grounds that immigration law
implicates foreign relations and national security," it nonetheless
has upheld discriminatory decisions "even in the absence of a
specific, plausible foreign policy rationale."7 6
C. Plenary Power Synchronicity: National Security Linkage
The Court has long deferred to the political branches on matters
of national security in a host of constitutional contexts. Immigration
is no different. In fact, the Chae Chan Ping Court's invocation of
national sovereignty in deference to the political branches rested
primarily on the close linkage between foreign affairs and
immigration control decisions.7 7 And while not every immigration
case before the Court presents an explicit national security
justification for the actions of the political branches, the ones that do
reflect plenary power at its most robust. In these cases, the Court
traditionally has been willing to overlook significant, deliberate
constitutional rights violations in deference to vaguely articulated
national security interests.7 8 In this sense, "[tihe Court implicitly
remains willing to give the political branches leeway to use
immigration authorities in rough-hewn ways, even though deference
does mean that some governmental acts deriving from illicit motives

75. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 772.
76. Spiro, supra note 14 (questioning what possible national security interests
could be promoted by denying a father from reuniting with his out-of-wedlock son
from the French West Indies).
77. See supra at II. A.; see also Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15 at 29
("The essay illustrates why such linkage is more significant than is often
appreciated, even today, as the federal government seeks to work in a complex and
uncertain global context, where many powers taken for granted in the domestic
arena simply are not reliably available.").
78. See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 797 (upholding gender-based discrimination on
the basis of vague references to national security); see also Spiro, supra note 14 ("The
1977 decision in Fiallo v. Bell - well into the modern-era rights revolution - is
particularly instructive. The case involved a facially discriminatory provision of the
Immigration Act that recognized the relationship between children born out of
wedlock with their mothers but not their fathers. The regime implicated a doublebarreled discrimination for equal protection purposes, implicating the suspect classes
of gender and legitimacy. The Court upheld the provision on the basis of exactly the
kids of stereotypes that trigger close judicial scrutiny in any other context.").
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rather than genuine foreign affairs considerations may go
unremedied in court."79
The Chae Chan Ping Court expressly relied on this idea of
national security linkage despite a dubious security rationale for
Chinese exclusion, noting that, as a matter of "self-preservation," the
government has the "highest duty" to "preserve . . . independence,
and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment."8 0 It
then presented the blank check:
To achieve these ends, the government is clothed with
authority to determine the occasion on which the powers
shall be called forth; and its determinations, so far as the
subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive
upon all its departments and officers. . . . The existence of
war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more
obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing
degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same
authority which adjudges the necessity in one case must also
determine it in the other. In both cases its determination is
conclusive upon the judiciary.8 1
The Court reaffirmed this holding in Knauff and Messi, both
times confirming that the government need not present the Court
with any evidence to substantiate its national security rationales.
Likewise, in 1952, three long-time residents of the U.S. were ordered
deported because of their former membership in the Communist
Party. 82 Though noting the severity of deporting aliens who had
resided within the country for such a lengthy period of time, the
Court affirmed the deportations by finding that, "any policy toward
aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power,
and the maintenance with a republican form of government. Such
matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference."88

79. Why PlenaryPower Endures, supra note 15, at 29.
80. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
81. Id. at 612.
82. Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585 (1952).
83. Id. at 587-88 ("Nothing in our structure of government or the text of our
Constitution would warrant judicial review by standards which would require us to
equate our political judgment with that of Congress.").
Indeed, this rationale
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The Court relied on this rationale again in the 1972 decision
Kleindienst v. Mandel, in which the Court affirmed the government's
authority to refuse a visa to a Belgian journalist who described
himself as "a revolutionary Marxist," and who had been invited to
speak at American universities. 84 The Court acknowledged that the
visa denial impacted freedom of speech and thus allowed-at least
formally-that a minimal form of judicial review should apply. 8 5 But
the Court expressed a reluctance to tread heavily upon the decision
of the executive branch because the government had articulated a
national security justification for the exclusion-namely, the
government's desire to exclude Communists and their ideals from
the country during the Cold War. 86

Despite compelling arguments

that excluding the journalist from the country did nothing to
advance national security interests, and possibly even harmed them
given the negative press coverage surrounding the case, the Court
again deferred, finding that the government only needed to state a
"facially legitimate and bona fide" basis for the visa denial.8 7
Relying again on murky national security grounds, a plurality of
the Court sought to reaffirm the Court's deference to national
security concerns in the absence of any substantiating evidence in
the 2015 case Kerry v. Din.88 Fauzia Din, a United States citizen,
challenged the State Department's refusal to grant a visa to her
Afghan husband.8 9 Din argued that the visa denial infringed her
right to marriage, and as a matter of due process, the State
Department owed her a specific explanation for the decision.9 0 The
State Department had given no explanation except for a vague
reference to the statute banning people who have engaged in
terrorist activities from entering the United States.9 1 Din did not
ask the Court to rule on whether her husband actually was a
terrorist. Rather, she asked for a process that would meaningfully
allow the couple to respond to the allegations. 92

articulates what many believe to be an axiom of immigration policy - that, by
definition, immigration actions affect national security because they involve
migration from foreign territories. See generally infra.
84. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 760.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 762.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 772.
135 S.Ct. 2128.
Id. at 2135.
Id. at 2136.
Id.
Id.
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In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that the government's vague
and unspecified reference to terrorist activity constituted a sufficient
"facially legitimate and bona fide" reason to justify the exclusion,
even though the "reason" was so generically worded as to prevent
Ms. Din from even responding to the denial.93 Writing for the
plurality, Justice Kennedy expressly relied on Mandel for the
proposition that the government need only state a reason for the
denial cloaked in national security to satisfy its burden, regardless of
whether any evidence could be mustered to support the proferred
reason. 94 Like the Court in Mandel, Justice Kennedy expressed fear
the courts could be dragged into every case in which the government
found a person inadmissible and would be asked to balance the
would-be immigrant's interests against the national security
interests of that of the United States.9 5
Like the Court in Harisiades, some scholars have argued that
such deference ought to be afforded on national security grounds in
all immigration cases because all immigration decisions implicate
foreign affairs, and thus national security concerns.96 Immigration
is one of the nation's many policy tools in the foreign arena, which
are "crude and imprecise, with uncertain impact."9 7

Therefore,

deference to the political branches is necessary to allow flexibility in
the application and adaptation of these tools.98
In addition to this normative position on national security
linkage, consequentialist considerations caution against exacting

93. Id. at 2138.
94. Id. at 2140; see also Plenary Power is Dead!, supra note 16, at 7 ("In so
concluding, Kennedy's opinion relieves the government of virtually any
accountability in its exclusion decisions, in effect conceding that the courts will not
scrutinize a consular decision that is erroneous, arbitrary, or even motivated by ill
will, so long as the government remembers to cite a statute that provides for the
exclusion of certain noncitizens.").

95. Id.
96. See Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 39-40; cf. Immigration
Exceptionalism, supra note 8, at 583 (discussing the "general trend" among plenary
power scholars justifying immigration federal preemption on national security
grounds); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 965, 967 (2004) (maintaining that "the immigration power is an
exclusively federal power that must be exercised uniformly" because immigration
inherently involves foreign affairs and national security).
97. Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 42.
98. Id. ("A too-ready judicial interference would also impair our ability to deploy
uncertain tools - deriving from immigration control, trade regulation, or other
components of our international relations - according to a single unified strategy.").
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judicial scrutiny in national security immigration cases. "In the
international arena, U.S. actors generally cannot invoke compulsory
process or other reliable coercive means under their own
government's control."9 9
Moreover, "the kind of detailed
constitutional scrutiny appropriate for the mature and developed
domestic public order is not workable in the more primitive
international legal system, marked primarily by horizontal action
and response to try to rectify breaches." 00
III. WEAKENING FOUNDATIONS: TRUMP'S ExEcuTIvE ORDERS AND
MODERN PLENARY POWER EROSION
Recent treatment of the plenary power doctrine by courts and
litigants alike highlights how each of the three pillars of plenary
power are under attack. The recent litigation surrounding Trump's
executive orders on immigration casts these attacks into sharp relief.
First, the exceptional approach to immigration law defined by
plenary power had foundations that have become jurisprudentially
questionable in the twenty-first century. The Court's early tendency
to see immigration authority as emanating from inherent national
sovereignty rather than from the Constitution has come under fire
from scholars on the left who decry this reasoning as a justification
to trample on individual liberties,1 0 1 and scholars and judges on the
right who doubt the validity of jurisprudential doctrines grounded in
anything but the original text and meaning of the Constitution.1 0 2
As a result, courts have increasingly acknowledged that at least
some minimal constitutional limitations should constrain federal
immigration power, even if only in the procedural due process
context.1 03 Moreover, litigation surrounding the executive orders
suggests that federal authorities seeking to justify rights

99. Id.

100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Plenary Power is Dead!, supra note 16 at 10 (welcoming the "war of
attrition" diminishing the plenary power doctrine vis-A-vis "questions of procedural
due process"); Susan Bibler Coutin, Justin Richland, and Veronique Fortin, Routine
Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the Indigenous Under
U.S. Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97, 100-101 (bemoaning the "veneer of legal form"
plenary power provides while in reality authorizing extralegal decisions by
immigration officials "to decide the status of immigrants ...
via a calculation that
remains almost entirely hidden").
102. See Somin, supra note 45.
103. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (in the procedural due process context,
immigration power is "subject to important constitutional limitations").
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infringements on national security grounds may have to do more
than simply say the magic words "national security" to survive
constitutional challenge. 0 4 That change-incremental as it may
be-would itself amount to a sea change for plenary power
jurisprudence.
A. Inherent Sovereignty: The DisappearingChinese Exclusion Case
Chae Chan Ping remains the seminal case not only for the notion
of a federal plenary power over immigration, but for the inherent
and absolute right of the federal government to enact immigration
laws as representatives of a sovereign nation. Regardless of one's
own feelings about the case itself, no immigration scholar would
argue that Chae Chan Ping has been consigned to the "dustbin of
history" or that it is any less important today as a precedent than it
was sixty years ago. 0 5 Perhaps most importantly, neither the case
itself nor its inherent national sovereignty reasoning has ever been
overruled.10 6 So to the extent immigration cases implicate plenary
power and national sovereignty issues, one would expect the
government to rely on the Chinese Exclusion Case and would expect
courts to discuss it.
But that is not the case. The last time the Supreme Court cited
Chae Chan Ping was in the 2001 case Zadvydas v. Davis. 07
Importantly, the Court referenced Chae Chan Ping not to reaffirm
its holding or continued relevance, but for the proposition that
sovereign power over immigration is subject to constitutional
limits. 1 08 While this proposition was mentioned in passing in Chae
Chan Ping, it was promptly ignored by the Court as it affirmed the
absolute power of the political branches over immigration. That the
case would emerge in the twenty-first century not to reaffirm this

104. See Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (per curiam)
(rejecting the government's position that immigration decisions regarding national
security issues are unreviewable: "There is no precedent to support this claimed
unreviewability, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our
constitutional democracy."); Int'l. Refugees Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at
612 ("The deference we give the coordinate branches is surely powerful, but even it
must yield in certain circumstances, lest we abdicate our own duties to uphold the
Constitution.").
105. KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 18 (2007).
106. Spiro, supra note 14.
107. Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?, supra note 11, at 84.
108. Id.; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
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absolute federal authority but to caution that it remains constrained
by the Constitution is telling. In 2017, the Ninth Circuit cited the
Chinese Exclusion Case for exactly the same principle,10 9 suggesting
that the case, and its reliance on notions of inherent national
sovereignty, may be quietly fading from the immigration canon.
Perhaps more telling is the reluctance of Trump's Department of
Justice to cite Chae Chan Ping. "If ever a case existed to breathe
new life into the Chinese Exclusion Case, it is the sprawling
litigation over Trump's executive orders. The Chinese Exclusion
case so closely parallels the present case that failing to mention it
seems like a form of malpractice. The holding of the decision
squarely favors the Trump Administration."1 10 Just as in Chae
Chan Ping, the executive orders involve a "blanket ban on
immigration based on nationality,". "apparent animus as a
motivation for the ban," and "refusal to allow re-entry even for legal
residents."n "And yet, when the first version of the travel ban was
enjoined, the Department of Justice failed to mention the Chinese
Exclusion Case in its filings to the District Court and in its
emergency appeal to the Ninth Circuit." 112 Nor was it mentioned in
the government's appeals to the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal seeking reversal of the injunctions preventing
implementation of the executive orders.
While the Justice Department may simply have concluded that
citing a case so openly resting on anti-canonical racist reasoning
would be too politically embarrassing, one questions whether a case
so squarely favorable to the President would be ignored for purely
optics reasons. In contast, the Attorney General of Washington
made the Chinese Exclusion Case a central character in his state's
brief seeking to enjoin the first executive order, arguing that the
case was a relic of a bigoted past, an episode to be learned from
rather than a precedent to be followed: "Accepting the President's
approach would take us back to a period in our history when
distinctions based on national origin were accepted as the natural
order of things, rather than outlawed as the pernicious
discrimination that they are."113

109. Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?, supra note 11 at 84.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 20-21, Washington v. Trump,
No. 2:17-CV- 00141-JLR (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 30, 2017), 2017 WL 511013; cf.
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595, 606 (1889) (sustaining the Chinese Exclusion Act

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

754

[Vol. 84.3

This silent rejection of the very case establishing the extraconstitutional basis for plenary power, as well as recent attempts by
the Court to ground immigration authority in an enumerated power,
strongly suggests that the "inherent sovereignty" rational
underpinning plenary power for over a century is likewise slowly
falling out of favor.
B. Subject to Important ConstitutionalLimitations?
If plenary power's extra-constitutional foundations are silently
fading from judicial favor, its place as a trump card over
constitutional rights is facing a more explicit attack. Much of the
immigration jurisprudence of the twentieth century was marked by
complete judicial deference to the political branches on immigration
laws, even when such laws directly offended fundamental
constitutional rights to due process and equal treatment. 114 Yet in
the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has appeared much
more willing to review possible procedural due process violations. In
addition, the Court has largely eliminated the distinction between
criminal punishments requiring heightened judicial scrutiny and
"supposedly civil immigration enforcement" authorizing a more
limited judicial review. 115
This change promises to inject more
exacting review into certain deportation cases, as they are now
conceptualized similarly to criminal punishments.
In 2017, the
President's executive actions have pushed the envelope further and
led courts to rule, at least preliminarily, that his exercise of federal
immigration power likely unconstitutionally violated fundamental
substantive norms of due process and equal protection, a direct
rebuke to the nature of plenary power as we have traditionally

known

it.116

because the Chinese "remained strangers in the land," constituted a "great danger
[to the country]" unless "prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration," and
were "dangerous to [the country's] peace and security").
114. See supra H. B.
115. Michael Kagan, Shrinking the Post-PlenaryPower Problem, 68 FLORIDA L.
REV. F. 59, 63 (2016).
116. Washington v. Trump et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, Dkt. No. 52 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (finding that the states "are likely to succeed on the merits of the
claims that would entitle them to relief'); Int'l. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d at 622 ("[1In the context of an alleged violation of First Amendment rights,
a plaintiffs irreparable harm is inseparably linked to the likelihood of success on the
merits. Accordingly, the court's finding that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on
the merits of their constitutional claim counsels in favor of finidng that in the
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In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court held that the government lacked
statutory authority to detain indefinitely Kestutis Zadvydas, a
resident noncitizen subject to a final order of removal, and ordered
Zadvydas released from federal custody and paroled into the United
States.11 7 The issue involved a statute providing that aliens set for
deportation could not be held in detention for longer than ninety
days unless the Attorney General determined the individuals "to be
a risk to the community," in which case the aliens "may be detained
beyond the removal period."1 18 Immigration officials could not find a
country willing to receive two deportable aliens within the ninetyday period but continued to hold the aliens in detention pursuant to
the statutory exception.1 19 Rather than directly confronting the
constitutionality of the statute itself, the majority reviewed the
legislative intent of the statute and held that it could not find "any
clear indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney
General the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien
ordered removed," which would constitute a violation of due
process.120
The Court ultimately found that the dictates of
constitutional due process required that, after a period of six months'
detention, the government provide evidence that further detention
was necessary. 121
Thus, while the Court rested it's holding on statutory
interpretation, it nonetheless injected constitutional due process
considerations into the analysis to circumscribe an executive branch
immigration action. 122 The Court observed the "cardinal principle of

absence of an injunction, they will suffer irreparable harm."); cf. Hawaii v. Trump,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10356, at *30 (9th Cir. 2017) (enjoing the second executive
order on statutory grounds but declining to reach the constitutional issues because
"if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other involving a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter.").
117. 533 U.S. at 684-85, 702.
118. Id. at 694.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating"ImmigrationLaw," 68 FLA.
L. REV. 179, 227, 229 (2016) ("By the Court's own admission . . . the plenary power
doctrine prevented Zadvydas from challenging the statute directly on Fifth
Amendment grounds... . [But a] five-Justice majority 'construe[d] the statute to
contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to
federal court review.'").
121. Id. at 696.
122. See Lindsay, supra note 120, at 231 ("Given that Zadvydas was, at bottom, a
case about statutory construction, one might have expected the Court's analysis to
center on the text and perhaps the legislative history of the relevant provision. But
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statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises a
serious doubt as to its constitutionality, this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided." 123 But then the majority
acknowledged that, even if Zadvydas lacked a legal right to live at
large in the United States and Congress retained plenary power over
the removal of noncitizens like Zadvydas, such power nevertheless
was "subject to important constitutional limitations." 1 24
In a
dramatic change in tone from the complete deference of early
immigration decisions, the Court noted merely the "greater
immigration-related expertise of the Executive Branch" and that
"principles of judicial review in this area recognize primary
Executive Branch responsibility." 125 Far from a complete abdication
of its judicial review role, the Court claimed instead that it would
"listen with care" to the concerns of the Executive when reviewing
the constitutionality of immigration policies. 126
Nine years later, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court largely
undermined
the
formalistic
distinction
between
criminal
punishments and supposedly civil immigration enforcement, "a
distinction that had long been invoked to prevent immigrants from
claiming more procedural rights when they face deportation." 2 7
This distinction has meant, among other things, that a noncitizen

it did not. . . . Justice Stephen Breyer devoted eight pages of his twenty-one page
majority opinion to the 'obvious' constitutional difficulty 'arising out of a statute
that .. . permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent, deprivation of human liberty
without judicial protection.").
123. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696; see also Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
at *30 (same).
124. 533 U.S. at 693 ("Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint - lies at the heart of the liberty that
[the Fifth Amendment Due Process] Clause protects.").
125. Id.
126. Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 120, at 229 (observing that Justice Breyer
discounted "the relevant of the usual rationales for buffering immigration
regulations against constitutional review. The case did not involve 'terrorism or
other special circumstances,' he reasoned, 'where special arguments' grounded in
national security might justify 'preventive detention and ... heightened deference to
the judgments of the political branches."').
127. 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010); Lindsay, supra note 120, at 230 ("The Supreme
Court destabilized another key pillar of the plenary power doctrine in the 2010 case
of Padilla v. Kentucky: the notion that because removal from the United States is
defined legally as a civil proceeding rather than criminal punishment, noncitizens
subject to removal are not entitled to the suite of rights that protect criminal
defendants against governmental abuses of power.").
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facing the prospect of removal does not have a Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel, is not entitled to a Mirandawarning, and
cannot suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 128 While the Court again did not directly invalidate an
immigration action on constitutional grounds, the majority's
emphasis on the enormous stakes of removal as a reason to expand
the constitutional rights of noncitizen criminal defendants highlights
the increasingly sympathetic approach the Court has taken to
constitutional immigration challenges.1 29
These two landmark decisions highlight that some level of
constitutional judicial review now exists with respect to immigration
laws. Following that trend, a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals emphatically rejected the contention of Trump's
Justice Department that the judicial branch cannot review executive
branch immigration orders. The Trump Administration advanced
this absolutist position in its defense of the first executive order
before Judge Robart, asserting that courts "cannot . . . review the
President's . . . executive order," precisely because "[tjhere is . . . no
basis for the
Judiciary to second-guess
the President's
determinations" in the immigration context.1 30 While this position
had appeared at one time to rest on firm legal footing, both Judge
Robart and a unified panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the notion of absolute judicial deference.131
Opinions by the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal regarding the second executive order likewise confirmed the

128. Lindsay, supra note 120, at 231.

129. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 660.
130. Washington v. Trump, 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, Dkt. No. 50 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2,
2017) at 20-22 (asserting that immigration decisions are "areas within the exclusive
domain of the political branches of government.. . . It is thus well-established that
courts cannot evaluate the President's national security and foreign affairs
judgments, especially in the immigration context... . It is simply not possible for the
Court here to evaluate the President's executive order without passing judgment on
the President's national security and foreign affairs determinations... There is ...
no basis for the Judiciary to second-guess the President's determinations in that
regard.").
131. See Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (per curiam)
("[Tlhe Government has taken the position that the President's decisions about
immigration policy ...
are unreviewable, even if those actions potentially contravene
constitutional rights and protections.
The Government indeed asserts that it
violates separation of powers for the judiciary to entertain a constitutional challenge
to executive actions such as this one. There is no precedent to support this claimed
unreviewability, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our
constitutional democracy.") (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)).
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role of judicial review of immigration actions. However, while by
courts affirmed lower court rulings enjoining the order in its
entirety, the approach taken by the respective courts in doing so
differed dramatically. In a 205-page opinion, the Fourth Circuit
delivered a dramatic and forceful rebuke of President Trump's
actions with sweeping language about "an Executive Order that in
text speaks with vague words of national security, but in context
drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination."1 3 2 The
Fourth Circuit addressed each claim of the plaintiffs - both
constitutional and statutory - in exhausting detail, and refuted the
arguments of the government point by point.133 Ultimately, the
court rested on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in
finding that the plaintiffs likely would succeed on the merits that the
order unconstitutionally stated a preference for one religion over
another, based in large part "on evidence that the order was
motivated by the President's desire to exclude Muslims from the
U.S."134
The Ninth Circuit took a much more restrained approach,
deliberately sidestepping the more controversial constitutional
questions in favor of finding that the President had exceeded his
statutory authority to regulate immigration as delegated to him by
Congress.135
While the court acknowledged the district court's
finding that the executive order likely violated the Establishement
Clause, it declined to review this finding because "the district court's
preliminary injunction order can be affirmed in large part based on
statutory grounds." 136

132. Int't Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 565 ("The question for
this Court, distilled to its essential form, is whether the Constitution ... remains 'a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace.' And if so, whether it protects
Plaintiffs' right to challenge an Executive Order that in text speaks with vague
words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus,
and discrimination. Surely the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment yet
stands as an untiring sentinel for the protection of one of our most cherished
principles - that government shall not establish any religious orthodoxy, or favor or
disfavor one religion over another.").
133. See generally id.

134. Id.
135. Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS at *1 ("We concluded that the
President, in issuing the Executive Order, exceeded the scope of the authority
delegated to him by Congress.. .. On these statutory bases, we affirm in large part
the district court's order preliminarily enjoining Sections 2 and 6 of the Executive
Order.").
136. Id. at *30 ("After first determining that Plaintiffs have standing to assert
their INA-based statutory claim, we conclude that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood
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But what the decisions shared was an unambiguous declaration
that the judicial branch has a meaningful role to play in reviewing
the immigration decisions of the political branches, breaking with
the decades of plenary power deference of the mid-twentieth century.
The Ninth Circuit explained its role thusly:
We reject the Government's argument that the Order is not
subject to judicial review. Although [t]he Executive has
broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens, 0j
that discretion is not boundless. It extends only as far as the
statutory authority conferred by Congress and may not
transgress constitutional limitations. It is the duty of the
courts, in cases properly before them, to say where those
statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.
Whatever
deference we accord to the President's immigration and
national security policy judgments does not preclude us from
reviewing the policy at all. 137
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit found that:
The Government has repeatedly asked this Court to ignore
evidence, circumscribe our own review, and blindly defer to
executive action, all in the name of the Constitution's
separation of powers. We decline to do so, not only because it
is the particular province of the judicial branch to say what
the law is, but also because we would do a disservice to our
constitutional structure were we to let its mere invocation
silence the call for meaningful judicial review. The deference
we give the coordinate branches is surely powerful, but even
it must yield in certain circumstances, lest we abdicate
our own duties to uphold the Constitution.13 8

of success on the merits of that claim and that the district court's preliminary
injunction order can be affirmed in large part based on statutory grounds. For
reasons further explained below, we need not, and do not, reach the Establishment
Clause claim to resolve this appeal. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[If a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter.").
137. Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS at *30.
138. Int'l. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 609
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Some contend that the Court's recent reconsideration of
immigration exceptionalism generally and plenary power specifically
is unremarkable because the Court's treatment of immigration
policies has never been any more "exceptional" that its treatment of
domestic laws. 139 For example, three days after entry of the first
executive order, Professor Adam Cox challenged the so-called "myth
of unconstrained immigration power" in declaring that the "Muslim
ban is likely to be held unconstitutional."1 4 0 According to Cox, the
assumption that "[t]he so-called 'plenary power'. . . spell[s] the death
knell for any constitutional claim brought by immigrants seeking
admission .. . is simply wrong. The 'plenary power doctrine' is more
of a rhetorical trope than a coherent judicial doctrine."141
Cox claims that plenary power is more myth than reality because
each of the seminal constitutional immigration law cases "was
decided during a constitutional era when such policies were often
accepted as a matter of domestic law as well." 42 Rather than
representing a sovereign exception to the reach of the Constitution,
these so-called "plenary power" cases were in fact consistent with the
contemporary interpretation of the Constitution.143
This theory has intuitive historical appeal, but it relies on a
tortured reading of precedent. Had Chae Chan Ping and its progeny
been decided on the basis that the challenged exclusionary
classifications were substantively permissible, the decisions surely
would have said so. But they did not. Instead, these cases

139. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 9, at 257; cf. Lindsay, supra note 120, at 179
(recognizing the "constitutional exceptionalism of federal immigration power" but
advancing the claim that such exceptionalism is slowly eroding).

140 Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban is Likely to Be Held Unconstitutional:The Myth
of Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutional-mythunconstrained-immigration-power/ ("The plenary power does not stand for the
proposition that blatant . . . discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or
ideology is constitutionally permissible in immigration policy.").
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. This reinterpretation of the plenary power cases was first introduced by Jack
Chin in 1999, when he observed that "the Court's treatment of substantive
immigration classifications . .. may not be that different from how it has treated
those groups domestically.. . . At the time they were decided, may of the terrible
immigration cases could have come out the same way even if they involved the rights
of citizens under domestic constitutional law." Chin, supra note 9, at 257-58
(asserting that "the Court has rarely, if ever, tested discrimination against a group in
the immigration context at a moment when it had already recognized that the
Constitution prohibited discrimination on that ground against citizens").
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universally reasoned that the challenged immigration policies were
immune from constitutional challenge and judicial review, not that
they withstood constitutional challenge after judicial review.144
Indeed, this theory that constitutional immigration jurisprudence
remains consistent with constitutional domestic jurisprudence is
directly contradicted by the Court's clear pronouncement in Fiallo v.
Bell that, "In the exercise of its broad power over immigration and
naturalization, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens."1 45
In short, while the Court has consistently reaffirmed the
existence of plenary power, "recent developments in constitutional
immigration law have begun to chart a course toward . . . the
encroachment of mainstream constitutional norms" into the
analysis. 146 These mainstream norms are now on full display in the
executive orders litigations.1 47
C. Muslims Bans, Pretext, and a More SearchingNational
Security Inquiry
Scholars have long observed that the Supreme Court has
probably overstated the foreign affairs dimension of immigration
policy.148 Most recently, Professor Lindsay forcefully argued that
federal authority over foreign affairs and national security provides
less than compelling evidence for federal authority over the many
routine and practical questions that arise in the daily practice of

144. See generally supra at II. A.
145. 430 U.S. at 797; see also Spiro, supra note 14 ("The 1977 decision in Fiallov.
Bell - well into the modern-era rights revolution - is particularly instructive. The
case involved a facially discriminatory provision of the Immigration Act that
recognized the relationship between children born out of wedlock with their mothers
but not their fathers. The regime implicated a double-barreled discrimination for
equal protection purposes, implicating the suspect classes of gender and legitimacy.
The Court upheld the provision on the basis of exactly the kids of stereotypes that
trigger close judicial scrutiny in any other context.").
146. Lindsay, supra note 120, at 228.
147. Id. at 228-33 (analyzing Zadvydas v. Davis).
148. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties,
35 Va. J. Int'l. L. 121, 167 (1994) (asserting that the foreign policy rationales
articulated to justify many immigration decisions are overblown); Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Reguluation, 106 Mich. L.
Rev. 567, 571-72 (2008) (arguing that the federal exclusivity principle justified by
national security concerns "has become a formal doctrine without strong
constitutional justification").
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"immigration law." 49 But even for those cases where the federal
government has unambiguously asserted a foreign policy or national
security rationale, it appears that courts are less willing than they
once were to simply step aside in the name of plenary power.
To be sure, passionate detractors to national security-based
plenary power deference have existed for nearly as long as the
doctrine itself. Justice Field, the author of the Chinese Exclusion
Case, first condemned in 1893 the "indefinite and dangerous"
doctrine of "powers inherent in sovereignty" as they could be wielded
in the name of national security.15 0 In the 1950's, Justices Black and
Douglas powerfully dissented in Knauff and Messi, with Black
comparing the government's "unreviewable discretion" with the
arbitrary ruthlessness of twentieth century Europe's most infamous
dictators. 5 1 More recently, Justice Souter decried the government's
ability to lock away" a noncitizen without first providing a
"sufficiently compelling" reason for doing so, a state of affairs he
claimed denied "the basic liberty at the heart of due process." 152
But each of these critiques were delivered in dissent. More
recently, the Court has shown a greater willingness to directly
challenge the notion of blind deference to national security. In Din,
although the government ultimately prevailed on the basis of secret
evidence and vague references to terrorism, a bare majority voted in
favor of the government and no majority opinion could be
established.1 53 Moreover, only two Justices relied on traditional
plenary power doctrine while a full six Justices rejected the concept
of "consular absolutism"-the notion that there is no right to judicial
review when a consular officer rejects a visa application. 154 Thus,

149. Lindsay, supra note 120, at 179-181.
150. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 722 (Field, J., dissenting).
151. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting).
152. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Lindsay, Due Process and Plenary Power, supra note 57 ("In spite of
the Mandel Court's forthright affirmation of the plenary power doctrine, the majority
opinion attests that the due process revolution of the 1960s and 1970s had indeed
penetrated immigration law in a meaningful if circumscribed way. In Mandel the
government had informed Mandel of the concrete facts that led to his visa denialspecifically, Mandel's violation of visas issued to him in the past.").
153. Din, 135 S.Ct at 2138, 2140-42.
154. Id. at 2140-45; Plenary Power is Dead!, supra note 16, at 22 ("The plurality
opinion by Justice Scalia sidestepped the Court's immigration jurisprudence entirely
and focused instead on a critique of substantive due process jurisprudence generally
as if the case presented a typical domestic constitutional issue.").
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"while Kerry v. Din was not a renunciation of the plenary power
doctrine, it was not a reaffirmation of the doctrine, either."15 5
This diminished fealty to ambiguous national security concerns
is a central feature of the ongoing executive orders litigation. The
title of the executive orders themselves bespeaks at least a facial
national security justification behind the bans. But simply claiming
that a proposed action is designed to stop terrorists and actually
proving it is so designed are two different things in this modern era
of weakened plenary power. As Judge Robart explained in oral
argument held before he enjoined the first executive order, the
government must, at the very least, prove that its policy is
"grounded in fact instead of fiction .. . You're here arguing on behalf
of someone who says we have to protect the U.S. from these
individuals coming from these countries, and there's no support for
that."15 6
It is possible, then, to conclude that the national security
justifications for the executive orders are just "laughably weak,"15 7
which explains the administration's problems in court. But what are
the long-term implications for plenary power? What happens when
an immigration decision less shrouded in bare animus and more
directly linked to a tangible national security concern comes before
the Court. Should courts be in the business of examining not only
the national security motivations behind certain immigration actions
but also the efficacy of those actions vis-A-vis those stated
motivations? As the next section illustrates, such a paradigm shift
is neither wise nor likely.
Instead, courts should attempt to
reconcile the reality of a weakened plenary power with the need for
continued deference in the area of national security.

155. PlenaryPower is Dead!, supra note 16, at 22.
156. Washington v. Trump et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, Dkt. No. 52 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); see also Int'l. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at
612 ("The Government's argument that EO-2's primary purpose is related to national
security is belied by evidence in the record that President Trump issued the First
Executive Order without consulting the relevant national security agencies and that
those agencies only offered a national security rationale after EO-1 was enjoined.
Furthermore, internal reports from DHS contradict this national security rationale,
with one report stating that 'most foreign-born, US-based violent extremists likely
radicalized several years after their entry to the United States, limiting the ability of
screening and vetting officials to prevent their entry because of national security
concerns."').
157. Shikha Dalmia, The Obscure Doctrine That Could Save Trump's Travel Ban,
THE WEEK (Apr. 6, 2017) http://theweek.com/articles/688615/obscure-doctrine-thatcould-save-trumps-travel-ban.
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IV. RECONCILING A WEAKENED PLENARY POWER WITH A DANGEROUS
GLOBAL WORLD

"In theory, the erosion of plenary power should lead to a
corresponding erosion of immigration exceptionalism." 15 8 But should
that be the case, at least as far as national security is concerned?
While little textual or logical support exists for complete judicial
abdication in all immigration matters, there remains an important
place for some level of deference to the political branches over vital
national security interests, where time-sensitive calculations must
be made, where rights infringements are arguably more justified,
and where courts often have incomplete information of the purported
security threat. The foregoing discussion highlights how plenary
power as a doctrine has weakened, and for good reason. But that
does not mean it should be discarded entirely, at least where
national security interests are at stake.
The following section builds on Professor Lindsay's idea of
"disaggregating" immigration law, and advances a three-tiered level
First, courts should
of judicial review for immigration cases.
articulate what precise, enumerated constitutional power confers
upon the federal government the ability to engage in whatever
immigration action is being challenged in court. Second, courts
should engage in a searching judicial inquiry to determine whether
vital national security interests are indeed at the heart of the
challenged immigration action, and whether these interests
primarily motivated the challenged action. Third, depending on the
answer to the second inquiry, courts should either accord deference
to the government's national security rationales and apply a
modified rational basis review to the challenged action, or accord no
deference to purely domestic (or non-national security) immigration
actions and impose the standard of review appropriate for the claim
as if the action were purely domestic in nature.
A. GroundingImmigration Policy in Enumerated Constitutional
Power
If one is to save at least some limited form of plenary power from
its slide into irrelevance, one must first address its problematic
foundations. The Court's decision in Chae Chan Ping to settle on
extra-constitutional sources for the federal government's power over
immigration contradicts the fundamental limited federalist

158. Kagan, supra note 115, at 63.
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structure of our constitutional system and leaves all such exercises
of power open to first premise attacks. Basing a federal power on
"inherent" concepts of power also leaves little room for a principled,
moderated middle ground on such power-either the federal
government possesses inherent, unreviewable immigration power or
it possesses no separate immigration power at all.
To resolve this tension, courts should be explicit about the
specific,
enumerated
constitutional
source
of the federal
government's power to enact a particular immigration regulation or
take a particular immigration action when it reviews such actions.
Doing so will help alleviate the concern of progressive civil
libertarians and conservative originalists alike. But it will also
achieve something much more important: it will acknowledge the
vast and varied applications of "immigration law" in a range of
contexts, foreign and domestic, familial and national, territorial and
military. Professor Lindsay's remarkable insight behind his theory
of disaggregation is that "immigration law" is not a monolithic entity
like torts or contracts or criminal law.159 It is instead the application
of a theoretically limitless sets of legal doctrines and subject matters
to theoretically limitless set of fact patterns with a single common
denominator - a noncitizen seeking entry to or continued residence
in the country.
Thus, some cases will involve commerce or
naturalization, while others will involve foreign affairs generally or
national security specifically. 160
Courts have already begun doing this, at least implicitly. Just as
the Court has become more willing to find constitutional limitations
on immigration enforcement, it has also changed its conception of
the foundations of that power. The Court continues to hold that the
"federal government has broad immigration authority, but it has
more recently rooted this authority in constitutionally enumerated
powers, specifically naturalization, foreign affairs, and the impact on
commerce."16 1 By rooting immigration authority in enumerated text,
the Court has continued to "push strongly toward normalizing
immigration within constitutional law." 16 2

159. Lindsay, supra note 120, at 180.
160. Id. at 183-88.
161. Plenary Power is Dead!, supra note 16, at 27; Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. at 2498. See also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and the Supreme Court, 200913.- A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKL. L. REV. 57, 59-60
(2015) (concluding that the Roberts Court "has to a large extent continued to bring
U.S. immigration law into the legal mainstream").
162. Plenary Power is Dead!, supra note 16, at 27.
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B. SearchingFora Legitimate and Bona Fide National Security
Interest
In determining whether a particular immigration action
amounts to an exercise of the commerce power, the naturalization
power, or the foreign affairs power, courts implicitly will be opining
on whether national security interests are implicated. But given the
importance of national security as arguably the primary
responsibility of the federal government, it behooves courts
reviewing immigration decisions to further determine whether and
to what extent an immigration decision was made for national
security reasons. This approach is wise jurisprudentially as well,
because courts have traditionally (and for good reason) given more
deference to the political branches when vital national security
interests are at stake. Before giving such deference, whether in the
immigration or another context, it would be wise for courts to
affirmatively determine that such deference is warranted.16 3
To this end, courts should carefully examine the record and the
arguments advanced by the respective parties in determining
whether national security interests were central to the immigration
action taken, merely incidental to the action taken, or merely served
as a pretext for a potentially more nefarious and less justifiable
reason. Hints of this approach can be seen in Kerry v. Din,
ostensibly a national security immigration case. Only Justices
Kennedy and Alito affirmatively relied on plenary power as
traditionally understood to find that the federal government acted
within its foreign affairs powers to deny basic procedural protections
to an Afghan national and his American wife on vague national
security grounds.16 4
Justice Scalia, while siding with the
government, implicitly rejected the contention that the case was
about national security at all.16 5

Instead, he attacked the Court's

163. See Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 48 ("A more nuanced

branch of the Chae Chan Ping criticism accepts that foreign affairs considerations
may well be at stake in some immigration decisions, but would modify the doctrine to
allow for a carefully structured closer judicial look. The courts, such observers
contend, should not take political branch assertions as controlling, but instead
should perform an initial judicial probe of the asserted reasons, to decide whether
the challenged immigration restriction rests on a significant foreign affairs
foundation. If the answer is yes, then the reviewing court should treat the political
branches' decision as dispositive - essentially, as a political question not subject to
judicial review.").
164. Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2140-42.
165. Id. at 2131-38.
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fundamental rights jurisprudence in questioning whether Ms. Din
had presented a valid liberty interest in the "right to live in the
United States with her spouse." 16 6 Thus, to Justice Scalia, the case
did not require balancing individual rights with national security
interests so much as assessing the sufficiency of the individual
rights claim itself, much like a traditional domestic civil rights case.
The four dissenting Justices, meanwhile, demanded much more
from the federal government than a vague and unspecified reference
to excluding terrorists from the country. Justice Breyer's dissent
insisted that the denial of a noncitizen's visa application interferes
with a constitutional liberty interest and that such interference
warrants "individualized adjudication," including "the ordinary
application of Due Process Clause procedures."1 67
Once again, the litigation surrounding Trump's executive orders
throws this issue into sharp relief. The title of both executive
orders-"Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United
States"
xpressly
articulates
a
national
security
justification for the blanket immigration bans. Under the more
deferential plenary power standard of the mid-twentieth century,
this would have ended the inquiry. The government has stated that
is has a national security reason for its blanket ban, and that is
enough. But in 2017, merely putting the word "terrorist" in the title
of an immigration order does not - and should not - suffice. A more
searching judicial inquiry is warranted.
For example, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the government's
attempt to proffer evidence in support of its argument that the
second executive order's "primary purpose is related to national
security," but found such evidence lacking. 168 In particular the
Court noted that "the only examples [the government] provides of
immigrants born aborad and convicted of terrorism-related crimes in
the United States include two Iraqis - Iraq is ont a designated
country in EO-2 - and a Somalian refugee who entered the United
States as a child and was radicalized here as an adult." 169 Rejecting
this evidence as "unconvincing," the Fourth Circuit concluded that
"any national security justification for EO-2 was secondary to its
primary religious purpose as was offered as more of a 'litigating
position' than as the actual purpose of EO-2."17o

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 2131.
Id. at 2144.
Int'l. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 609.
Id.

170. Id.
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The executive orders litigation also highlights the problem of
judicial parsing of mixed motives and attempting to divine intent
from sources beyond the four corners of a legislative or executive
enactment.171 But a closer look at the history and effect of the
executive orders illustrates why courts should inquire with some
exactitude into whether national security concerns played a primary
or merely pretextual role in a particular challenged immigration
enactment. 17 2 In other words, this initial inquiry into the primary
motivation behind an immigration decision would be "normalized" or
"constitutionalized" to mirror that of a traditional discriminatory
intent analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, where
a government official's true intent is determined through extrinsic
evidence. 173
Consider, for example, the language, effect, and stated intent of
the first executive order. Section 3(c) of the Order imposed a
temporary ban on the entry of immigrants and non-immigrants from
seven Muslim-majority nations: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria,
Sudan, and Yemen. 174 While religiously-neutral on its face, the
overwhelming evidence points to a discriminatory motive by the
Administration to exclude at least some subset of Muslims from the
country on the basis of their religious affiliation. In addition to the
President's consistent campaign promises to implement a "Muslim
ban" and to "certainly implement" a Muslim registry in the U.S.,175

171. Id.

172. See id.
173. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 852 (2005)
(explaining that "[an assessment of the purpose of an action is a 'common' task for
courts . . . In determining purpose, a court acts as an 'objective observer' who
considers 'the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act."').
174. See supra note 5 ("To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant
agencies . . . I hereby proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into
the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and
nonimmigrants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order. . .").
175. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for "Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims
Entering the United States, " WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-totaland-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-unitedstates/?utmterm=.a8f48091alae.; see also Alana Abramson, What Trump Has Said
About a Muslim Registry, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com
/Politics/trump-musim-registry/story?id=43639946
(documenting then-candidate
Trump's numerous statements about a possible Muslim tracking system, including
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Trump surrogate Rudy Giuliani confirmed to Fox News the day after
the order was signed that Trump wanted to find a "legal" way to ban
Muslims from the U.S.176 Moreover, when signing the executive
order, Trump read out its title "Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States," looked up and said "We all
know what it means . . ."177 These admissions "close in time" to the
signing of the executive order squares with then-candidate Trump's
explicit admission in a July 2016 interview on Meet the Press that
he would revamp his "extreme vetting" proposals to target Muslims
without expressly saying so.178
The executive order also explicitly stated that the U.S.
government would grant priority status to refugees from these seven
countries who were persecuted on the basis of their religion, so long
as that religion was a "minority" in one of the seven countries. 17 9

the following answer to the question "is there going to be a database that tracks
Muslims here in this country?": "Oh I would certainly implement that. Absolutely.").
176. Amy B. Wang, Trump asked for a 'Muslim ban,' Giuliani says - and ordered
a
commssion
to
do
it
'tegally', WASH.
POST
(Jan.
29,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-amuslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-itlegally/9utmterm=.93ab42422ef7 ("So when [Trump] first announced it, he said,
'Muslim ban.' He called me up. He said, 'Put a commission together. Show me the
right way to do it legally."'). See also Faiza Patel, Yates Letter Points to Evidence
Showing executive order Unconstitutional, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/37053/yates-letter-points-evidence-showing-executiveorder-unconstitutionall ("Giuliani then noted that his commission came up with the
idea to focus on danger rather than religion; that the ban was based 'on places where
there are [sic] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our
country.' Of course, as many have pointed out, the countries affected by the ban
have hardly been a source of terrorist attacks in the United States.").
177. Faiza Patel, Yates Letter Points to Evidence Showing Executive Order
Unconstitutional,JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2017) ("And for what it's worth, the son of
then-National Security Advisor Michael Flynn praised the executive order the day
after it was signed in a tweet stating "#MuslimBan.").
178. Id. When NBC's Chuck Todd asked if Trump was retreating from his
"Muslim ban" proposal, Trump responded that he was actually expanding on that
proposal but lamented that he could no longer be explicit about the intent of the
proposal: "I actually don't think it's a rollback. It fact, you could say it's an
expansion ... People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can't use
the word Muslim. Remember this. And I'm OK with that, because I'm talking
territory instead of Muslim." Jeremy Diamond, Trump on latest iteration of Muslim
ban:
'You
could
say
it's
an
expansion',
CNN
(Jul.
24,
2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/24/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-election2016/index.html.
179. See Executive Order 13769 at 5(b) ("Upon the resumption of USRAP
admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
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This provision obviously excludes Muslim refugees from these seven
Muslim-majority nations. Lest there be any confusion about the
intent behind this provision, Trump told the Christian Broadcasting
Network hours before signing the executive order that the purpose of
the order was to prioritize Christian refugees over Muslims who had
been "treated terribly" in these countries. 18 0 These two provisions of
the executive order, combined with contemporaneous evidence of the
order's intent, appear to represent textbook government preference
for one religion over another.
But contrast this damning and compelling evidence of improper
discriminatory motives with the government's stated and implied
It is
national security motivations in the executive orders.
indisputable that the previous administration had singled out the
seven countries listed in the first executive order as "countries of
concern" for future terrorist attacks.1 8 1 Standing alone, this fact
would seem more than sufficient to conclude that a legitimate
national security rationale exists to justify the executive orders.
Under traditional notions of plenary power generally, and judicial
deference to national security interests specifically, the inquiry
would end there.
But this fact does not exist in a vacuum, and while it may prove
that a legitimate rationale exists to plausibly justify the orders, it
does not prove that such a rationale motivated the orders. 182 This
distinction is critical, because "the same government action may be
constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if it

Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent permitted by law, to
prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based
persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in
the individual's country of nationality.").
180. Daniel Burke, Trump says US will prioritize Christianrefugees, CNN (Jan.
30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-christian-refugees/.
181. Kyle Blaine and Julia Horowitz, How the Trump administrationchose the 7
countries in the immigrationorder, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017) ("The seven Muslimmajority countries targeted in President Trump's executive order on immigration
were initially identified as 'countries of concern' under the Obama administration.");
cf. Int'l. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 609 ("According to former
National Security Officials, Section 2(c) serves 'no legitimate national security
purpose,' given that 'not a single American has died in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil
at the hands of citizens of these six nations in the last forty years' and that there is
no evidence of any new security risks emanating from these countries.").
182. Int' Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 610 (concluding that
this national security rationale was proferred more as a post hoc "litigating position'
than a motivation for the orders, given that the relevant national security agencies
"only offered a national security rationale after EO-1 was enjoined.").
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has a sectarian heritage." 183 While some may bristle at the "peculiar
and unsettling possibility . . . that an identical order would be
upheld if Barack Obama had issued it, but . . . invalidated because

Trump was the author,"1 84 the Supreme Court has long made clear
that "purpose matters."1 85
C. ExercisingAppropriateDeference in National Security Cases
The Fourth Circuit's decision striking down Trump's executive
orders as unconstitutional did not require the court to overrule the
plenary power doctrine in its entirety. The court only ruled that the
doctrine is not so sweeping as to permit blatant religious
discrimination unsupported by any reasonablesecurity rationale. As
discussed supra, courts evaluating the executive orders have
struggled to determine whether national security concerns actually
played any significant role in the challenged immigration actions as
opposed to bare religious animus. But assuming that the next case
presents the Court with an immigration action taken clearly for
national security reasons, the question then becomes what standard
of review should apply to evaluating these security rationales.
In the area of national security specifically, courts should apply a
low level, deferential standard of review to immigration challenges,
even if those challenges assert fundamental constitutional rights. In
this sense, this Article advocates for a modified plenary power with a
more limited scope but which walks and talks like traditional
plenary power within that scope. In other words, the plenary power
doctrine should only apply to cases implicating true national security
concerns, but in those cases plenary power should still largely
operate as a mechanism to grant the political branches broad
deference to make immigration decisions. While the exact phrasing
of the standard of review matters little, both the Court in
Kleindienst and Judge Robart in the first executive order litigation

183. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.
184. Jeffrey Toobin, The Courts and President Trump's Words, THE NEW YORKER
(Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.newyorker.comlnews/daily-comment/the-courts-and-

president-trumps-words. ("The Muslim ban is either constitutional or it's not-and
Donald Trump's words on the campaign trail don't settle that question one way or
the other.").

185. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (citing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's oft-quoted
aphorism that "even a dog knows the difference between being kicked and being
stumbled over"); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 7 (M. HOWE ED.
1963).
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have articulated standards that reflect the appropriately deferential
attitude towards cases involve actual cases of national security.1 86
Two primary justifications exist for this continued adherence to
deference in the field of national security. First, courts have proven
themselves well-equipped over two centuries to appropriately
balance individual constitutional rights with the domestic concerns
of a government infringing on those rights. However, the Court has
long "harbor[ed] a deep skepticism that lower courts can be trusted
to give sufficient weight to foreign policy concerns in making any
such threshold assessment. . . . Keeping the plenary power doctrine
categorical gives the Supreme Court greater assurance that lower
courts will preserve the space needed for government actions to meet
real foreign affairs imperatives (even if this stance inevitably also
leaves room for some ill-motivated actions adopted by the political
branches)."1 87
Second, and relatedly, the changing nature of our global world in
the nearly thirty years since the end of the Cold War has been
marked less by increased global cooperation and safety than by
increased isolation, nation-state distrust, and transnational
terrorism. As Professor Martin explains:
It appeared we were on the cusp of a far more benign world
order - one that might permit the rapid flowering of more
protective international legal institutions and thereby reduce
reliance on crude action-and-response in the international
arena. Today's global scene is far more grim. Not only has the
United States experienced the trauma of al Qaeda's
September 11 attacks, which revealed a genuine need for
more vigilant immigration screening, but democratic nations
are
also
facing
new
global
threats
from
other
nongovernmental actors who actually glorify the use of
beheadings, crucifixion, and slavery, in addition to other

186. See, e.g., Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 772 (holding that a "facially legitimate and
bona fide" national security rationale would pass constitutional muster); see supra
note 6.
187. Why Plenary Power Endures, supra note 15, at 48 ("The very nature of
immigration litigation in the courts of appeals, with an actual and often sympathetic
human being front and center, makes a reviewing judge far more likely to overvalue
the individual interests at stake and undervalue the more subtle and complex
reasons why a particular measure may be needed for system stability or to influence
behavior beyond our borders - connections that often would not become fully
apparent until broader damage is manifested months or years after an
interventionist judicial decision.").
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players using more old-fashioned forms of terrorism directed
at civilians. Failed states are more common, and well-armed
insurgencies have proliferated. The march of democracy has
slowed and, in several countries, reversed. Climate change
and even plague-like diseases presage more complicated
foreign policy challenges, many of which will have a
migration dimension. The risks to the United States, if our
government's
foreign-policy-linked
initiatives
are
unsuccessful, now seem far higher than in 1989.1s8
This bleak geopolitical reality in no way justifies disregarding
the rights of individuals guaranteed under the Constitution. But it
does highlight the increasingly complex, multipolar, interconnected
world in which we live, and thus the increasing inability to predict
with any certain the long-term impact of governmental foreign policy
actions - including immigration actions. For better or worse, we no
longer live in a pre-internet world with two readily defined nationstate superpowers, where international actions and reactions were
at least moderately more predictable and stable.
Today, the
proliferation of powerful non-state foreign aggressors with global
cyberstrategic capabilities, combined with the other complicating
factors outlined by Martin above, render the judiciary that much
more incapable of precisely weighing the benefits of a national
security objective against the costs of a potential constitutional
violation.
It is for this reason as much as any other that this Article
advocates for a most searching and exacting threshold judicial
inquiry to determine whether an immigration action truly was
motivated by national security concerns: because once that
determination has been made, the prudent course is for the judicial
branch to grant wide latitude to the political branches to act as they
see fit in keeping with traditional notions of plenary power. In other
words, because the consequences of categorizing an immigration
action as one implicating national security are significant, that
categorization should not be made lightly.
D. Normalizing Non-NationalSecurity Immigration Cases
Critics of plenary power have long sought to "normalize" or
"constitutionalize" immigration law by urging courts to treat all
immigration cases raising constitutional challenges exactly the same

188. Id. at 49-51.
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as any other domestic constitutional cases.189 As should be evident
at this point, this Article agrees with these critics' concerns about
unfettered political plenary power over immigration, but disagrees
with the proposed solution of eliminating all deference to the
political branches, at least insofar as genuine national security
issues are concerned. And while a lengthy discussion of whether and
in what form plenary power should survive in non-national security
cases is beyond the scope both of this Article, it bears at least
mentioning the possibly seismic implications of "constitutionalizing"
plenary power.
As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found in upholding
the injunction against the first executive order, there is ample
Supreme Court authority for the rule that non-citizens in the U.S.
have procedural due process rights.1 90 In particular, in the 1963
decision Rosenberg v. Fleuti, the Court held that returning legal
residents have a right to a hearing before they are excluded from reentering the country. 191
But procedure is one thing. Striking down immigration decisions
on substantive constitutional grounds opens a veritable Pandora's
box of challenges to immigration law and policy as we know it. For
example, what if Ms. Din had prevailed and the Court had
recognized not only her right to a fair process but also "that
immigration exclusions must bend to a citizen's right to
marriage?"1 92
Would that necessarily invalidate existing
immigration quotas on spousal unification visas? 19 3 And what of
Equal Protection Clause challenges more generally? Immigration
law and policy is in many ways defined by nationality-based

189. See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 120, at 234; PlenaryPower is Dead, supra note
16, at 29; Anne R. Traum, ConstitutionalizingImmigration Law On Its Own Path, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (arguing that courts should continue to rely on due
process "to ensure that immigration proceedings are fair, just, and sufficiently
transparent").
190. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) ("The
procedural protections provided by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause are
not limited to citizens. Rather, they "appl[y] to all 'persons' within the United States,
including aliens," regardless of "whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent." These rights also apply to certain aliens attempting to
reenter the United States after travelling abroad.") (citations omitted).
191. 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963) ("[T]he returning resident alien is entitled as a
matter of due process to a hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude
him.").
192. Plenary Power is Dead!, supra note 16, at 32.
193. Id.
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discrimination that would be constitutionally unsupportable in a
purely domestic context.1 94 The wholesale adoption of substantive
constitutional rights jurisprudence in the immigration arena, while
arguably justified in non-national security cases, would require, at a
mimmum, a radical rethinking of the entire field of "immigration
law."
Rather than focusing on how individual substantive rights might
apply in the immigration context, a more consistent and familiar
inquiry may very well be the one defining the executive orders
litigation - the intent inquiry. That is, regardless of the rights
affected by a particular immigration decision, no immigration will
pass muster if it was made with invidious, unconstitutional animus.
"If applicable to immigration, the rule against animus would
represent an important, though fairly moderate, substantive
constitutional limitation on immigration policy. It would allow
many forms of nationality discrimination, if based on neutral
criteria," thus allowing generalized immigration policy to continue
without requiring massive, judicially-forced upheaval. 9 5
Such an anti-animus rule, while facing the same evidentiary
problems of any discriminatory intent analysis, would likely help
root out those immigration actions that "violate contemporary
constitutional norms" and thus test the outer limits of plenary power
in the non-national security context.1 96 Perhaps, if such "a case
arises which challenges discrimination on a ground that violates
contemporary constitutional norms, the Court will be faced with a
new situation."'9 7 Chin called these the "easy, unlikely cases"19 8 :
The best test of the plenary power doctrine would involve a
statute discriminating on a basis which domestic law clearly
forbids. If persons of African ancestry or Jewish religion or
Democratic Party membership were made ineligible for
immigration or naturalization . . . the Court would
overwhelmingly vote to strike it down. Yet, it is not likely

194. Id. ("Since the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act there has never been a
time when the United States had an immigration policy based entirely on
individualized criteria, with country of citizenship playing no role.").
195. Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?, supra note 11, at 87.
196. Chin, supra note 3, at 220.
197. Id. Indeed, the recent "encroachment of constitutional norms" in immigration
jurisprudence may have less to do with a substantive shift by the Court than a
recognition of the societal shift in what may generally be considered in modern
American life to be a fundamental constitutional norm.
198. Id. at 285
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that we will see such a case. It is conceivable that Congress
will cut immigration drastically, but it is extremely difficult
to imagine in 1999 that any future Congress would pass, and
a president would sign, anything like the National Origins
Quota System or Chinese Exclusion Act. If the unlikely
happened, such laws would probably be invalidated.1 9 9
If the executive orders serve as prologue for the "extreme
vetting" policies of the next four years, the Supreme Court may soon
face one of these "easy, unlikely cases."
V. CONCLUSION

"The plenary power doctrine has the virtue of being a broad
theory capable of guiding the resolution of all of immigration cases,
even if it resolves them in problematic ways." 2 0 0 But a blunt tool

cannot be justified simply because it is easy to use. A normative
justification for such a broad, powerfully influential doctrine is
wanted, and yet one remains elusive 128 years after its creation.
The various rationales commonly invoked-inherent sovereign
powers to control territorial borders, lack of judicial expertise in
foreign affairs, the need for the nation to "speak with one voice" on
the world stage-fail to adequately explain why courts must treat all
run-of-the-mill familial immigration cases identically to cases of
imminent national threat.
Yet closely examining these underlying rationales highlights the
continued relevance - indeed, continued need - for the plenary

power doctrine in the twenty-first century. Our world is increasingly
global, connected, transnational, and dangerous. Moreover, much of
the threat comes not in the form of form state declarations of war,
but in the mobile movement of terrorists and smugglers across
international borders, both legally and illegally. Thus, it is obvious
that many immigration laws, regulations, and decisions made by the
federal government will be aimed squarely at protecting our nation's
security from these threats. In these more limited circumstances, a
199. Id. Some constitutional immigration scholars resist the notion that "[tlhe
transition to a constitutionally unexceptional immigration power is unlikely to be
accomplished all at once in a dramatic act of judicial overturning." Lindsay, supra
note 120, at 259. But this contention presupposes a continuation of the sorts of
"traditional" immigration cases coming before the Court. Just as few could or did
predict the political rise of Donald Trump, few could or did predict the "unlikely case"
of an immigration order in 2017 based on all-but explicit religious discrimination.
200. Kagan, supranote 115, at 66.
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modified form of judicial deference remains wise. While this Article
calls for more exacting scrutiny into whether a particular
immigration matter truly affects national security, it nonetheless
advocates deference to the political branches when a case truly does
affect security interests.
The litigation surrounding the Trump executive orders is unique
and helpful in this regard in several ways. First, the brazen
discriminatory animus motivating the Orders has forced the courts
to directly confront whether any federal immigration action is so
obviously noxious and unconstitutional as to fall outside the purview
of the plenary power doctrine. Second, the pretextual national
security rationales within which the Trump Administration has
sought to drape these orders provides the perfect opportunity to
examine why courts should be careful to examine whether a case
genuinely implicates legitimate national security concerns before
blindly deferring to the will of the political branches. Third, the
revised attempt of the administration to offer a legitimate national
security reason in its second executive order, coupled with evidence
of a genuine threat from the affected countries, gives reason to
consider just how much deference ought to be afforded to the
political branches on matters of national security, even when basic
constitutional guarantees are infringed in the process.
The Trump executive orders do not respond to a true national
security emergency, but to a growing xenophobic, nationalist
sentiment among a minority of the voting public. They should not
survive constitutional scrutiny, nor should any doctrine of deference
that would compel their survival in the face of obvious constitutional
violations.
But the offensiveness and inadequacy of these
unprecedented immigration actions should not cause us to throw the
baby out with the bathwater. Plenary power is flawed and should be
strictly limited, but it should not yet be discarded entirely. In the
not-too-distant future our country will face an urgent national
security threat, a threat that may legitimately require tightened
immigration controls. When that day comes, we will regret not
being able to respond effectively to the threat if we allow the racist
tendencies of one man to bind our hands when a true threat
emerges. If we do, these executive orders may cause more long-term
damage to our security than they already have.

